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1 Introduction
John Horty’s book ‘Agency and deontic logic’ appeared at Oxford Press in 2001.
It develops deontic logic against the background of a theory of agency in non-
deterministic time. Several philosophical reviews of the book appeared since
then [1–5]. Our goal is to present the book to a general AI audience that is
familiar with action theories developed in AI, classical decision theory [6], or
formalizations of temporal reasoning like Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [7,
8]. Therefore, in contrast to the philosophical reviews, we discuss and explain
several key examples in the book. We do not explicitly discuss the relevance for
AI and law, because the book itself is not concerned with the application of the
theory to the legal domain. However, the relevance of deontic logic and normative
reasoning for legal reasoning is well established by a number of publications on
deontic logic in AI and law, see for example the special issue of this journal on
agents and norms (volume 4, 1999).
Horty presents a formal account of what individuals and groups of agents
ought to do under various conditions and over extended periods of time, using the
‘Seeing To It That’ or STIT framework [9]. He explicitly develops a utilitarian
/ consequentialist perspective, which means roughly that an act is obligatory
if performing it results in an optimal state of affairs. However, the question
whether a state of affairs is ‘optimal’ is not a question that is exclusively linked
to the deontic point of view. And also, seeing deontic necessity only from the
perspective of an agent’s welfare (optimality), might not suffice to model all
subtleties involved in the semantics of deontic notions. Therefore, it is easy to
be confused by the examples; sometimes it is not immediately clear why they
are especially relevant for deontic logic.
Horty focusses on the common assumption that what an agent ought to
do can be identified with the notion of what it ought to be that the agent
does, and argues that this assumption is wrong. The assumption is based on the
well-known conceptual distinction in deontic logic that concerns the notions of
ought-to-be and ought-to-do. Roughly, ought-to-be deontic statements express a
norm about the satisfaction of certain conditions at certain moments. Ought-
to-do deontic statements apply to actions, which have been argued to fall in a
different ontological category than conditions [10, 11]. The distinction between
ought-to-do and ought-to-be forms the starting point for Horty’s journey.
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The central problem addressed in the first three chapters is the question
whether ought-to-do deontic statements can be formalized within a STIT-framework
that is extended with a Standard Deontic Logic or SDL-style ought-operator
[12]. In particular, it is investigated whether it is intuitive to model ‘agent α
ought to do A’ as ‘it ought to be that agent α sees to it that A’ in the STIT-
framework. Horty argues that the answer is negative, and proposes, in chapter 4,
a deontic operator that does formalize ought-to-do statements within the STIT-
framework. In the remaining three chapters of his book Horty generalizes this
theory to the conditional case, the group case, and the strategic case. The em-
phasis throughout the book is conceptual rather than technical, and as such
the book is more aimed at offering food for thought for developers of deontic
logic than at providing deontic logics which can directly be used in applications.
Questions concerning deontic logic and the logic of agency are considered in
parallel with issues from moral philosophy and the philosophy of action. This
allows for a number of recent issues from moral philosophy to be set out clearly
and discussed from a uniform point of view.
The review consists of two parts. In the first part we relate STIT-theory to
standard decision trees, and explain concepts and ideas by selecting and dis-
cussing examples that are central to Horty’s work. The critical discussion in
the second part concerns three aspects: the examples, the concepts modelled by
Horty’s logic, and logical and technical issues.
2 Examples
At first sight, Horty’s examples may seem innocent and their formalization
straightforward. However, a more detailed analysis reveals that each example
highlights a basic choice, which also is bound to appear in more detailed and
realistic examples. The examples thus play the same role as simple examples
in reasoning about action and change, like the widely discussed Yale shooting
problem and stolen car problem that illustrate the frame problem [13, 14].
2.1 From decision trees to STIT models
Horty uses STIT-models to discuss a variety of examples and concepts. However,
STIT-theory is not well-known outside the area of philosophical logic. There-
fore we first explain STIT-theory by relating STIT-models to standard decision
trees, which are well known in artificial intelligence. Roughly, each STIT-model
contains a classical decision tree with decision nodes that abstracts from the
probabilities. Horty describes the relation with decision theory as follows: ‘The
new analysis is based on a loose parallel between action in non-deterministic
time and choice under uncertainty, as it is studied in decision theory’ [15, p.4].
Decision trees are widely used to formalize decision problems. The branches
of decision trees represent courses of time. Nodes without branches are called
‘terminal nodes’, to distinguish them from other nodes where time may advance
and branch. Branching is either due to a choice made by the decision-making
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agent, or due to the occurrence of events, where each possible event is associated
with a probability. Branching nodes reflecting points of choice for the agent
are called ‘decision nodes’. Branching nodes that correspond to moments where
events occur are called ‘event nodes’. It is assumed that the decision-making
agent knows what the probabilities are for each branch of an event node. The
sum of the probabilities for the possible events at an event node is 1. Paths from
the root to a terminal node correspond to sequences of choices and events in
time. With each path a utility is associated, a kind of payoff under uncertainty.
Rationality is defined as choosing an alternative that has the highest expected
utility.
Of this decision theoretic setting, Horty adopts the utilities associated with
series of events and choices in a decision tree. Paths are called ‘histories’. Roughly,
STIT-models can be constructed from decision trees by dropping the event nodes,
and consequently, the probabilities. The branches of a dropped event node are
connected to the first decision node closer to the root in the tree, to form a
non-deterministic action. Figure 1 visualizes such a transformation by showing
a decision tree and the utilitarian STIT-model it reduces to. The decision tree
should be read as follows. Boxes represent decision nodes and circles represent
event nodes. Numbers at the end of paths through the tree represent utilities,
and events are provided with probabilities. Expected utilities are represented at
each node in italics.
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Fig 1. A decision tree and the corresponding utilitarian STIT-model
The two decision nodes of the decision tree correspond to the moments m
and n in the STIT-models. Histories are series of events and choices from the
root to the leaves of a STIT-model (h1 . . . h4 in figure 1). The event node in
the decision tree on the left has turned into a non-deterministic action Km2 ,
in the STIT-model on the right. Note that in the decision tree the choices in
decision nodes are always deterministic. This is because in the decision tree, the
non-determinism introduced by the events is ‘temporally separated’ from the
decision nodes. Another distinction is that decision trees have no valuations of
atomic propositions. In STIT-models there is a valuation of atomic propositions
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for every moment-history pair. Horty denotes the set of histories through a
moment m for which the atomic proposition A holds by |A|m, and the utility of
a history h by V alue(h).
Now we explain the semantics of some key concepts in Horty’s STIT-formalism.
A noticeable feature of the semantics is that formulas are evaluated with respect
to moment-history pairs, and not with respect to moments, which is the view-
point adopted in many temporal formalisms used in AI (e.g., CTL [7, 8]). This
refinement of the unit of evaluation is induced by the basic assumption of the
STIT-framework that actions constrain the possible future courses of time with-
out actually ‘taking’ time. This means that we need to partition the histories of
each moment according to the set of actions possible at it.
Some basic temporal formulas of Horty’s utilitarian STIT-formalism are A
and FA for ‘the atomic proposition A’ and ‘some time in future A’. In particular,
A is settled true at a moment-history pair m,h if and only if it is assigned the
value ‘true’ in the STIT-model; FA is settled true at a moment-history pair m,h
if and only if there is some future moment on the history, where A is settled
true. On the STIT-model of figure 1 we have M,m, h3 |= A, which follows
directly from the valuation of atomic propositions on moment-history pairs, and
M,m, h3 |= F¬A, which is due to the fact that the proposition ¬A is true later
on, at moment n, on the history h3 through m.
An action formula is [α cstit : A], ‘agent α Sees To It That A’. The ‘c’ in ‘cstit’
stands for ‘Chellas’, whose version of the STIT-operator [16] is predominant in
Horty’s work. [α cstit : A] is settled true at a moment history pair m,h if and
only if A is settled true at all moment-history pairs through m that belong to
the same action as the pair m,h, i.e., if h ∈ K at m then K ⊆ |A|m. Following
Horty, we use a symbol like K both as a name of an action at a moment m and
as a denotation for the set of ‘admissible’ histories determined by that action at
moment m. In figure 1, we have M,m, h3 |= [α cstit : A], because A holds for
all histories through m that belong to the action to which also h3 belongs, that
is, action Km2 .
Finally a deontic formula ©A stands for ‘it ought to be that A’. ©A is
settled true at a moment history pair m,h if and only if there is some history
h′ through m such that A is settled true at all pairs m,h′′ for which the history
h′′ has a utility at least as high as h′, i.e., ∃(m,h′) such that ∀(m,h′′) for which
V alue(h′) ≤ V alue(h′′) it holds that h′′ ∈ |A|m. In figure 1 we haveM,m, h3 |=
©A and M,m, h3 |= ©[α cstit : A]. These two meta-propositions are true for
the same reason: the history h4 through m has the highest utility and satisfies
both A and [α cstit : A] at m.
Note that this condition guarantees that on separate histories through a
moment any ought formula evaluates to the same value, which is why ought-
formulas are called ‘moment determinate’. This semantic condition for the to-be
ought is a utilitarian generalization of the standard deontic logic view (SDL [12])
that ‘it ought to be that A’ means that A holds in all deontically optimal worlds.
Satisfaction of a formula A by a STIT-model can be defined as truth of A in
all moment-history pairs of the model, and validity as satisfaction by all STIT-
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models. Horty does not give these definitions explicitly, but this is the general
STIT-view on validity (see, e.g., [9]).
2.2 ‘Ought-to-do’ and the gambling problem
The central thesis of the book is that ought-to-do statements cannot be for-
malized as ought-to-be statements about action. More precisely, Horty claims
that ‘agent α ought to see to it that A’ cannot be modeled by the formula
©[α cstit : A], whose reading is ‘it ought to be that agent α sees to it that
A’. Justification of this claim is found in what Horty calls the ‘gambling prob-
lem’ [15, p.53-58]. This example concerns the situation where an agent faces the
choice between gambling to double or lose five dollar (action Km1 ) and refraining
from gambling (action Km2 ). This STIT model is visualized in figure 2.
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Fig 2. The gambling problem [15, Fig 3.8]
The two histories that are possible by choosing action Km1 represent end-
ing up with ten dollar by gaining five, and ending up with nothing by loosing
all, respectively. Also for action Km2 , the game event causes histories to branch.
For this action the two branches have the same utility, because the agent is not
taking part in the game, thereby preserving his five dollar. Note this points to
redundancy in the model representation: the two branches are logically indis-
tinguishable, because there is no formula whose truth value would change by
dropping one of them.
The formula©[α cstit : A] is settled true at m, because the formula [α cstit :
A] is settled true for history h1 and for all histories with a higher utility (of
which there are none!). However, a reading of ©[α cstit : A] as ‘agent α ought
to perform actionKm1 ’ is counter-intuitive for this example. From the description
of the gambling scenario it does not follow that one action is better than the
other. In particular, without knowing the probabilities, we cannot say anything
in favor of action Km1 : by choosing it, we may either end up with more or with
less money then by doing Km2 . The only thing one may observe is that action
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Km1 will be preferred by more adventurous agents. But that is not something
the logic is concerned with.
This demonstrates that ‘agent α ought to see to it that A’ cannot be modelled
by©[α cstit : A]. The cause of the mismatch can be explained as follows. Adapt-
ing and generalizing the main idea behind SDL to the STIT-context, ought-to-be
statements concern truth in a set of optimal histories. Optimality is directly de-
termined by the utilities associated with the individual histories. If ought-to-be
is about optimal histories, then ought-to-do is about optimal actions. But, since
actions are assumed to be non-deterministic, actions do not correspond with in-
dividual histories, but with sets of histories. This means that to apply the idea
of optimality to the definition of ought-to-do operators, we have to generalize
the notion of optimality such that it applies to sets of histories, namely, the sets
that make up the non-deterministic actions. More specifically, we have to obtain
an ordering of non-deterministic actions that is based on the underlying ordering
of histories. The ordering of actions suggested by Horty is very simple: an action
is strictly better than another action if all of its histories are at least as good as
any history of the other action, and not the other way around.
Having ‘lifted’ the ranking of histories to a ranking of actions, the utilitarian
ought conditions can now be applied to actions. Thus, Horty defines the new
operator ‘agent α ought to see to it that A’, written as
⊙
[α cstit : A], as the
condition that for all actions not resulting in A there is a higher ranked action
that does result in A, together with the condition that all actions that are ranked
even higher also result in A. This ‘solves’ the gambling problem. We do not have⊙
[α cstit : A] or
⊙
[α cstit : ¬A] in the gambling scenario, because in the
ordering of actions, Km1 is not any better or worse than K
m
2 . So, it is not the
case that the agent ought to gamble, nor is it the case that the agent ought to
refrain from gambling.
2.3 The driving example
Horty generalizes the ordering on actions to the multi-agent context by imposing
the so-called ‘sure-thing principle’ [6]. If there are only two agents, then at m for
agent α action Km1 is better than action K
m
2 if for each action K
m
3 by agent β it
holds thatKm1 ∩Km3 is better thanKm2 ∩Km3 . Here, an intersection likeKm1 ∩Km3
stands for a group action where agent α and agent β simultaneously perform
Km1 and K
m
3 , respectively. The actions optimal for an agent α at a moment m
are denoted Optimalmα . The corresponding generalized operator
⊙
[α cstit : A]
reflects what Horty calls ‘dominance act utilitarianism’. The driving example
[15, p.119-121] is used to illustrate the difference between dominance act util-
itarianism and an orthodox perspective on the agent’s ought. Dominance act
utilitarianism says that α ought to see to it that A just in case the truth of A is
guaranteed by each of the optimal actions available to the agent – formally, that⊙
[α cstit : A] should be settled true at a moment m just in case Km ⊆ |A|m for
each Km ∈ Optimalmα . When we adopt the orthodox perspective, the truth or
falsity of ought statements can vary from index to index. The orthodox perspec-
tive is that α should see to it that A at a certain index just in case the truth of A
6
is guaranteed by the available actions that are optimal given the circumstances
in which he finds himself at this index. Horty uses the symbol
⊕
to denote the
orthodox ought operator.
According to Horty, the driver example is due to Holly Goldman [17], and
it is also discussed by Humberstone in [18], a paper that sets out in a different
context some of the fundamental ideas underlying the orthodox ought defined
by Horty.
“In this example, two drivers are travelling toward each other on a one-
lane road, with no time to stop or communicate, and with a single mo-
ment at which each must choose, independently, either to swerve or to
continue along the road. There is only one direction in which the drivers
might swerve, and so a collision can be avoided only of the drivers swerves
and the other does not; if neither swerves, or both do, a collision occurs.
This example is depicted in Figure 3, where α and β represent the two
drivers, Km1 and K
m
2 represent the actions available to α of swerving
or staying on the road, Km3 and K
m
4 likewise represent the swerving or
continuing actions available to β, and m represents the moment at which
α and β must make their choice. The histories h1 and h3 are the ideal
outcomes, resulting when one driver swerves and the other one does not;
collision is avoided. The histories h2 and h4, resulting either when both
drivers swerve or both continue along the road, represent non-ideal out-
comes; collision occurs. The statement A, true at h1 and h2, expresses
the proposition that α swerves.” [15, p.119]
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Fig 3. The driving example [15, Fig 5.6]
From the dominance point of view both actions available to α are classified
as optimal, i.e. Optimalmα = {Km1 ,Km2 }, because the sure-thing principle does
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not favor one of the actions over the other. Thus, one of the optimal actions
available to α guarantees the truth of A and the other guarantees the truth of
¬A. Consequently M,m 6|= ⊙[α cstit : A] and M,m 6|= ⊙[α cstit : ¬A]. But
from the orthodox point of view, we have for exampleM,m, h1 |=
⊕
[α cstit : A]
and M,m, h2 |=
⊕
[α cstit : ¬A], because A and ¬A hold for all optimal actions
given that agent α does Km1 or K
m
2 , respectively. So, α ought to do A or ¬A,
depending at the index.
Horty also discusses the so-called Whiff and Poof example, an example with
the same logical structure, introduced for example in [19–21]. In this example,
there are two agents in the moral universe, who can each push a button or not.
If both push the button the overall utility is 10, if neither push their button the
utility is 6, and otherwise 0. Both the driver example and the Whiff and Poof
example are instances of classical coordination games studied in game theory.
Horty concludes that from the standpoint of intuitive adequacy, the contrast
between the orthodox and dominance deontic operators provides us with another
perspective on the issue of moral luck, the role of external factors in our moral
evaluations [15, p.121]. The orthodox ought can suitably be applied when an
agent looks back in time and considers what he ought to have done in a certain
situation. For example, when there has been a collision then α might say –
perhaps while recovering from the hospital bed – that he ought to have swerved.
The dominance ought is looking forward. Though the agent may legitimately
regret his choice, it is not one for which he can be blamed, since either choice, at
the time, could have led to a collision. The distinction corresponds to what has
been called the diagnostic and the decision-theoretic perspective in [22], and can
be related to Thomason’s distinction between evaluative and judgmental oughts
[23].
2.4 Procrastinate’s choice
The example of Procrastinate’s choices [15, p. 162] illustrates the notion of strate-
gic oughts. A strategy is a generalized action involving a series of actions. Like
an action, a strategy determines a subset of histories. The set of admissible his-
tories for a strategy σ is denoted Adh(σ). If a strategy σ is not more than a
single action Km at moment m, i.e. σ = {〈m,Km〉}, Horty simply writes K
(assuming m is clear from the context) for Adh({〈m,Km〉}).
A crucial new concept here is the concept of a field, which is basically a sub-
tree of the STIT-model which denotes that the agent’s reasoning is limited to
this range. A strategic ought is defined analogous to dominance act utilitarian-
ism, by replacing actions by strategies in a field. α ought to see to it that A just
in case the truth of A is guaranteed by each of the optimal strategies available
to the agent in the field – formally, that
⊙
[α cstit : A] should be settled true at
a moment m just in case Adh(σ) ⊆ |A|m for each σ ∈ Optimalmα . Horty observes
some complications, and says that a ‘proper treatment of these issues might
well push us beyond the borders of the current representational formalism’ [15,
p.150].
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Horty also uses the example of Procrastinate’s choices to distinguish between
actualism and possibilism, for which he uses the strategic oughts, and in partic-
ular the notion of a field. Roughly, actualism is the view that an agent’s current
actions are to be evaluated against the background of the actions he is actually
going to perform in the future. Possibilism is the view that an agent’s current
actions are to be evaluated against the background of the actions that he might
perform in the future; the available future actions. The example is due to Jackson
and Pargetter [24].
“Professor Procrastinate receives an invitation to review a book. He is
the best person to do the review, has the time, and so on. The best thing
that can happen is that he says yes, and then writes the review when the
book arrives. However, suppose it is further the case that were he to say
yes, he would not in fact get around to writing the review. Not because
of incapacity or outside interference or anything like that, but because
he would keep on putting the task off. (This has been known to happen.)
Thus although the best thing that can happen is for Procrastinate to say
yes and then write, and he can do exactly this, what would happen in
fact were he to say yes is that he would not write the review. Moreover,
we may suppose, this latter is the worst thing which may happen.
[. . . ]
According to possibilism, the fact that Procrastinate would not write
the review were he to say yes is irrelevant. What matters is simply what
is possible for Procrastinate. He can say yes and then write; that is best;
that requires inter alia that he says yes; therefore, he ought to say yes.
According to actualism, the fact that Procrastinate would not actually
write the review were he to say yes is crucial. It means that to say yes
would be in fact to realize the worst. Therefore, Procrastinate ought to
say no.” [24, p.235]
Horty represents the example by the STIT-model in Figure 4. Here, m1 is the
moment at which Procrastinate, represented as the agent α, chooses whether or
not to accept the invitation: K1 represents the choice of accepting, K2 the choice
of declining. If Procrastinate accepts the invitation, he then faces at m2 the later
choice of writing the review or not:K3 represents the choice of writing the review,
K4 another choice that results in the review not being written. For convenience,
Horty also supposes that at m3 Procrastinate has a similar choice whether or
not to write the review: K5 represents the choice of writing, K6 the choice of
not writing. The history h1, in which Procrastinate accepts the invitation and
then writes the review, carries the greatest value of 10; the history h2, in which
Procrastinate accepts the invitation and then neglects the task, the least value
of 0; the history h4, in which he declines, such that a less competent authority
reviews the book, carries an intermediate value of 5; and the peculiar h3, in which
he declines the invitation but then reviews the book anyway, carries a slightly
lower value of 4, since it wastes his time, apart from doing no one else any good.
The statement A represents the proposition that he accepts the invitation; the
statement B represents the proposition that Procrastinate will write the review.
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Fig 4. Procrastinate’s choices [15, Fig 7.6]
Now, in the possibilist interpretation, M = {m1,m2,m3} is the background
field. In this interpretation, Procrastinate ought to accept the invitation because
this is the action determined by the best available strategy – first accepting the
invitation, and then writing the review. Formally, OptimalMα = {σ6} with σ6 =
{〈m1,K1〉, 〈m2,K3〉}. And since Adh(σ6) ⊆ |A|m, the strategic ought statement⊙
[α cstit : A] is settled true in the field M . In the actualist interpretation, the
background field may be narrowed to the set M ′ = {m1}, which shifts from the
strategic to the momentary theory of oughts. but In this case, we have
⊙
[α cstit :
A] is settled false. It is as if we choose to view Procrastinate as gambling on his
own later choice in deciding whether to accept the invitation. However, from this
perspective, this should not be viewed as a gamble; an important background
assumption – and the reason that he should decline the invitation – is that he
will not, in fact, write the review.
3 Discussion
3.1 The examples
The examples in Horty’s book are meant to provoke discussion. In this section
we raise some issues ourselves.
According to Horty [15, p.57], the gambling example “seems to reflect a real
difficulty with the strategy of identifying even a purely utilitarian notion of what
an agent ought to do with the notion of what it ought to be that the agent does
– at least on the basis of any theory conforming to the standard deontic idea
that whatever holds in all the best outcomes is what ought to be. Any such
theory would have the result that, in this situation, it ought to be that the
agent gambles; after all, gambling is a necessary condition for achieving the best
outcome, the outcome with the greatest utility.” This observation is the basis of
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the formal distinction between a logic for ought-to-be and a logic for ought-to-
do. However, the quote also indicates a way in which the two may be identified
anyway, namely by leaving the idea that whatever holds in all the best outcomes
is what ought to be! This idea of so-called standard deontic logic, a modal logic
proposed by von Wright in 1951, has been criticized during the last five decades
by many authors for various reasons, and many alternative deontic logics have
been proposed. Horty does not discuss the question whether his example is also
a problem for these logics. For example, in preference-based deontic logics [25]
an obligation for p is formalized by a preference of p over ¬p, i.e. O(p) = p Â ¬p.
For most preference orderings we do not seem to have the result that, in this
situation, it ought to be that the agent gambles. This suggests that the gambling
problem may not occur in such settings.
Moreover, Danielsson [3] observes that situations with the same structure
as the gambling problem also appear in examples with no actions involved. He
discusses an example in which a window may be open or not, and the wind
may bring something good or bad if the window is open. Finally, McNamara [?]
observes that the gambling problem is closely related to an example discussed
by Feldman [26]. Feldman imagines that it will rain tomorrow, and that given
that it rains it is best for the reporter to predict that fact. However, there is
no good reason now to think it will rain rather than that it won’t. It is in fact
indeterminate without probabilities. So although it is ideal for the reporter to
report that it will rain, it does not folow that he should do so.
The driver example is, as Horty observes, a classical coordination game as
studied in classical game theory. This raises the question whether the techniques
used in game theory are relevant for the analysis of this example. For example,
what is the role of Nash equilibria is the analysis of the example? Moreover, is
Horty’s philosophical study relevant for game theory, and if so, why?
Procrastinate’s choices also raises questions. For example, is the notion of a
field related to the notion of bounded or limited reasoning as studied in, amongst
others, artificial intelligence? Moreover, Horty does not discuss that the notion
of strategic ought can be applied to the most famous of all deontic examples,
Chisholm’s contrary-to-duty paradox, as has been suggested by van der Torre
and Tan [27]. Horty observes [15, p.40] that STIT-models can deal with reper-
ational oughts (contrary-to-duty oughts), but he does not discuss the paradox.
If in Figure 4 we read A as ‘the man tells his neighbors that he will come’ and
B as ‘the man goes to the assistance of his neighbors’, and the utility of history
h2 is raised to for example 8, then the STIT-model seems to reflect a variant of
Chisholm’s paradox:
1. A certain man is obliged to go to his neighbour’s assistance;
2. If he goes, he should tell them he will come;
3. If he does not go, then he should tell them that he does not come;
4. He does not go.
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3.2 The relation with other motivational concepts
As we mentioned in the introduction, Horty explicitly develops a utilitarian
perspective, which means roughly that an act is right or obligatory if it is a
best promoter of (social) welfare. Danielsson [3] emphasizes that it is also a
consequentialist perspective, which means that an act is right or obligatory if it is
a best act for achieving a highest ranked state of affairs. Danielsson also observes
that Horty apparently sees no need to discuss possible important differences
between rules of rational behaviour, moral rules, and rules of semantics, which
makes the whole project somewhat unclear.
The decision-theoretic setting used by Horty to define obligations has also
been used to define goals in knowledge-based systems in artificial intelligence,
and to define desires in belief-desire-intention (BDI) systems in agent theory, see
e.g. [28]. In such settings, the basic distinction between obligations on the one
hand and goals and desires on the other hand is that the former are external
motivations, whereas the latter are internal motivations of the agent.
Now, some of Horty’s examples can also be interpreted in terms of goals and
desires. For example, in another example [15, p.49] an agent is discussed who
wishes to buy a horse which costs $15,000 whereas the agent only has $10,000.
The problem in this example is whether the agent should bid $10,000 for the
horse or not. In this example, it seems that we might as well say that the agent
desires to buy the horse for $10,000. Horty mentions that his “characterization
of values, or utilities, as abstract, and intended to accommodate a variety of
different approaches. It says nothing about what is ultimately taken as a measure
of the individual agent’s utility – pleasure, mental states of intrinsic worth,
happiness, money, an ndex of basic goods” [15, p.38]. These measures seem
related to goals and desires.
Horty acknowledges this problem, when he observes that his notion of ought
is completely utilitarian, whereas our intuitive idea that an agent α ought to see
to it that A often seems to be sensitive to non-utilitarian considerations. Our
conception of what we ought to do is often influenced, not only by the utility
of the outcomes that might result from our actions, but also by considerations
involving a number of additional concepts, such as rights or personal integrity. If
Smith makes a promise to Jones, for example, Jones has a right, a claim against
Smith, that Smith should keep the promise, even if the outcome that would
result from Smith’s keeping the promise carries less utility than the outcome
that would result if the promise were broken.
Horty’s answer to such objections is pragmatic. Such objections, he says, are
perhaps too broad to be illuminating. The objection is directed not so much
against the analysis itself as against the utilitarian framework within which the
analysis is developed. Rather than attempting to model our ordinary, common
sense notion of what an agent ought to do, governed as it is by a variety of
considerations, he instead restricts his attention only to those oughts generated
by considerations of utility. His goal, then is to model only a more limited,
utilitarian notion of what an agent ought to do, a notion of what the agent
ought to do on the basis of utilitarian considerations alone [15, p.54].
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3.3 Logical and technical issues
Since Horty’s book is about logic, one may expect that the logical repercussions
of the semantic definitions in the book are studied in depth. However, the book
mentions most logical considerations only briefly.
For instance, it is mentioned that the logic of the composed operator©[α cstit :
A] is similar to the logic of
⊙
[α cstit : A]. Horty [15, p.79]: ‘Although perhaps
already apparent, it is worth noting explicitly that the notion carried by the new
operator of what an agent ought to do is logically neither weaker nor stronger
than the notion of what it ought to be that the agent does, but incomparable.’
Horty demonstrates this incomparability in various ways, since it is directly re-
lated to his central thesis about the irreducibility of the ought-to-do operator.
But in our opinion, the other part of the claim, i.e., that the first operator is
neither weaker or stronger than the second, requires a proof. It is not enough
just to observe and prove that the operators both satisfy some properties that
are typical for normal modal logics.
The second issue we raise in this section concerns the ‘intuitiveness’ of the
orderings used for actions. This concerns Horty’s choice for the definition of an
ordering of actions in terms of the ordering of the underlying sets of histories.
We argue that this ‘lifting’ of the ordering of histories to an ordering of actions
can also be defined intuitively in another way.
Notice first that in Horty’s formalism, the utilities associated with the histo-
ries are relevant in as far as they determine relative strengths. So, the absolute
values of the utilities have no meaning. In particular the following two models
are indistinguishable for Horty’s logic:
h h h
A
3 1 2
h h h
¬A
10000 0 5
m n
K
1
m
K
2
m
K
1
n
K
2
n
¬AAAA
12 31 2 3
Fig 5. Two models that cannot be distinguished in Horty’s logic.
The value of the numbers is only used to decide whether a history is better
or worse than another history, which means that any linear order will do. We
emphasize this point, because when being presented such example models one
is inclined to attach meaning to the absolute values. In particular, when one is
used to work in a classical decision theoretic setting, one could easily reason that
the high value in the left model will inevitably influence decisions, culminating
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in some formulas being evaluated differently. But, for Horty’s theory the two
choice situations are identical.
The above observation is important for our discussion on the lifting of the
ordering of histories to an ordering of actions. Consider the two choice situations
sketched in figure 6.
h h h
10 4 0
h
6
h h h
A
10 5 0
h
5
¬A
m n
K
1
m
K
2
m
K
1
n
K
2
n
¬A ¬A ¬AA A A
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Fig 6. Two more choice situations
In the situation on the left, Horty’s ordering on actions gives that action Km1
is better than action Km2 , resulting in satisfaction of
⊙
[α cstit : A] at m, i.e.,
the agent ought to perform Km1 . This is intuitive, since any possible outcome
of performing Km1 is at least as good as any outcome of K
m
2 . But in the choice
situation n on the right, Horty’s ordering gives no decision: there is a possible
outcome of Kn1 , namely history h2, for which there is an outcome of K
n
2 , namely
h3, that is better. So, it is not the case that the agent ought to do Kn1 , nor is it
the case that he ought to refrain from Kn1 (i.e. do K
n
2 ). However, we think that
in the utilitarian setting put forward by Horty, it is very well possible to defend
that action Kn1 is actually better than action K
n
2 . Let us analyze the information
contained in the model. As argued above, we should not attach any meaning to
the absolute values of the utilities. Then, all the information that is available
is that the highest utility can be reached by doing Kn1 and the lowest by doing
Kn2 , and what’s more, the highest utility cannot be reached by doing K
n
2 , and
the lowest cannot be reached by doing Kn1 . If an agent is presented with such a
choice, he should choose Kn1 , for two good reasons:
1. it is the only choice that might result in the best possible history, and
2. it is the only choice by which he can be sure to avoid the worst possible
history.
This line of reasoning cannot be countered by claiming that such arguments
should account for probabilities concerning the occurrence of separate histories.
As said, Horty simply does not consider a logic for situations where the proba-
bilities are known; the logic is only about choices, non-determinism and utilities.
It can also not be countered by claiming that there can be (causal) dependencies
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between the histories of separate actions. Such information is not represented in
the models, meaning that we cannot account for it in the logic.
We do not suggest that the above two conditions are each individually suffi-
cient for concluding that an action is better. But following the line of reasoning,
we can define a more subtle way in which an ordering of actions is derived from
an underlying ordering of histories. In [29] we show how to define such an or-
dering, and apply it to the semantics of deontic modalities in a dynamic logic
setting. If we apply this ordering to the present STIT-theory, we get a weaker
utilitarian ought-to-do-operator (weaker in the sense that it allows more models)
that also solves the gambling problem of fig. 2.
4 Conclusion
John Horty’s book ‘Agency and deontic logic’ develops deontic logic against the
background of a theory of agency in non-deterministic time. Horty tells a self-
contained story without loosing momentum by diving into the conceptual and
technical details that are met along the way. He formulates precise and clear,
and takes his time to put forward a wealth of concepts and ideas. The book
itself is not concerned with the application of the theory to the legal domain,
but the relevance of deontic logic and normative reasoning for legal reasoning is
well established.
We presented the book to a general AI audience that is familiar with action
theories developed in AI, classical decision theory, or formalizations of temporal
reasoning. We discussed three representative examples: the gambling paradox,
the driving example and Procrastinate’s choice. The first illustrates the distinc-
tion between ought-to-do and ought-to-be, the second illustrates the distinction
between dominance act utilitarianism and an orthodox perspective on the agent’s
ought. The third example illustrates the distinction between actualism and pos-
sibilism. The reader who is intrigued by one of the examples, or the distinctions
they illustrate, should read Horty’s book for the full story, and for other instruc-
tive examples and distinctions.
The book does not study the developed logics in any depth, and there are no
axiomatizations. Moreover, Horty does not discuss why utilities should be used
for obligations, in contrast to for example goals and desires. Finally, the relation
between his logic and related work in for example logics of action in AI, classical
decision theory, and temporal logic is not studied. This may be judged as an
omission, but also as an opportunity.
In this review we indicated how classical decision trees can be related to STIT
models, and we have given an alternative way to lift the ordering on histories
to a dominance relation on actions. We believe that the book is a good starting
point for other comparisons that relate philosophical logic to theories developed
in AI. We strongly recommend anyone interested in the philosophical and logical
aspects of reasoning about oughts, agency and action to get hold of a copy of
this book.
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